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Abstract  
European banks have experienced significant changes in the type of entity that owns them 
(another bank, an individual or a family, a non-financial company, an institutional investor, a 
government, a foreign entity, a domestic entity…). In this paper, we look at the influence of 
ownership type changes on performance. Working with a panel of commercial banks from 17 
European countries, we find that although banks that experience a change in ownership type 
do not exhibit lower or higher risk or profitability than other banks, their risk and profitability 
is significantly affected after the change takes place. The type of the acquirer plays a 
significant role in explaining the observed changes. When the acquirer is a non-financial 
company, the state or an institutional investor, the level of risk increases after the change 
while the level of profitability remains unchanged. Conversely, when the acquirer is a bank, 
we find that the level of risk-adjusted profitability decreases. Banks acquired by a different 
type of owner during the global financial crisis do not perform better or worse than they did 
before. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The global financial crisis has led to the partial nationalization of banks in many 
developed countries, which reverses a pattern of consistent declines in government ownership 
of banks throughout the world since 1970. Although the impact of such ownership changes on 
bank performance has received a lot of attention (see Clark et al., 2005 for a literature review 
of the effects of bank privatization on bank performance such as Beck et al., 2005; Bonin et 
al., 2005; Haber, 2005; Nguyen and Williams, 2005), the consequences of the resulting 
changes in bank ownership structure on risk have yet to be adequately explored. A change in 
bank ownership can indeed take various forms. An initially private bank can be acquired and 
controlled by a government or by another private entity of a different type (another bank, an 
individual or a family, a non-financial company, an institutional investor, a foreign entity, a 
domestic entity). In this paper, we investigate whether the changes in the type of controlling 
shareholders differently affects bank profitability and risk.  
The recent wave of consolidation and the rise of institutional investors in Europe has also 
affected the ownership structure of banks. While the main motivation for consolidation comes 
from the desire for growth, institutional ownership is mainly driven by value maximization 
concerns by possibly following hit and run strategies. Because of the different motivations 
underlying changes in bank ownership, it is important to distinguish the nature of the changes, 
which may generate differences in the level of bank risk taking. Furthermore, although 
controlling shareholders may have different risk preferences depending on their type, whether 
or not their desired level of risk can be achieved will also depend on their monitoring power 
and on internal governance mechanisms.   
Family-controlled banks, for example, may be more averse to risk taking due to their goal 
of transferring the firm to the next generation (Anderson et al., 2003). This may also be due to 
their inability to diversify their wealth outside the bank. Nevertheless, they may end up taking 
more risk due to managerial and capital constraints.  
Corporate-controlled banks are prone to participate in related lending, which could be 
both advantageous and risky. While insider lending may be a rational response to overcome 
asymmetric information issues, tunneling could also lead to inefficient capital allocation and 
higher risk. Moreover, an industrial group which owns a bank will act in the interest of the 
entire group, regardless of the possibly negative outcomes for the bank. Therefore, banks 
might pursue riskier strategies when they are controlled by a non-financial firm.  It could also 
be argued that non-financial companies might not be sufficiently diversified to pursue high-
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risk strategies in the banks they control. In addition, corporate owners often invest in firms for 
strategic reasons, for example, to delegate part of their activities or to take advantage of 
potential synergies and spillover effects between the owner and the controlled firm (Tribo et 
al., 2007). Thus, corporate-controlled banks may also have a preference for low risk.  
The main goal of institutional investors is to optimize their financial gains, which they 
can achieve by holding a diversified investment portfolio (Thomsen and Pedersen, 2000; 
Aggarwal et al., 2010). Institutional investors might therefore have a strong preference for 
higher risk-taking by the banks they control as long as net present value is positive. Compared 
with family, corporate and bank owners, institutional investors usually have an arm’s-length 
relationship with a firm. They are relatively less involved in the decision-making process and 
rather than spending time and resources to improve the performance of a company, they are 
more prone to play hit and run strategies (Ingley and Van der walt, 2004). As a result, their 
influence within a bank they control is likely to be lower compared to that of other controlling 
owners. However, institutional investors with significant voting power could also shape risk-
taking at the bank's level. In terms of shareholder control and expertise in processing 
information and monitoring managers, such investors have a much stronger influence than 
atomistic individual investors.   
There is no clear theoretical prediction on the risk preferences of banks controlled by 
other banks. When a bank owns another bank, the important risk-return relationship and 
strategies are expected to be handled by the parent company, and not at the subsidiary level. 
On the one hand, banks as shareholders might encourage relatively conservative risk-taking 
strategies for both safety-net reasons and reputation concerns. On the other hand, banks, 
especially when they are larger, tend to have diversified portfolios, which may increase their 
preference to take risk when controlling another bank. Consequently, in terms of their ability 
to achieve the desired level of risk, insider knowledge of business provides banks with a 
strong influence on the strategic choices and governance mechanisms to align management 
with their objectives.  
Several studies have found that state ownership of banks leads to inefficiency and poor 
performance (e.g La Porta et al., 2002). One reason is that management in these state-owned 
banks sometimes comes under pressure to serve particular political interests. In cross country 
analyses, Caprio and Martinez-Peria (2000) find evidence that a greater extent of state 
ownership of banks is associated with a higher likelihood of banking crises in developing 
countries during the 1980-1995 period. Barth et al. (2004) find that state-owned banks have a 
higher ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans, but do not find a significant impact of state 
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ownership on banking crises,  bank development and performance as measured by net interest 
margins and overhead costs. Using bank level data, Berger et al. (2005) and Iannotta et al. 
(2007) find that state-ownership of banks is associated with relatively high risk taking as 
measured by the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans, the standard deviation of banks' 
asset returns, and Z-scores. 
  Our paper complements the literature on the relationship between bank ownership 
structure and performance (risk/profitability) by further exploring the linkages between 
changes in bank ownership type and changes in terms of profitability and risk. We thus 
investigate banks whose type of ultimate owners have changed and examine how such 
changes have affected bank risk taking. We also look into how the type of the acquirer 
influences bank risk-taking and profitability. Rather than investigating ownership structure 
and ownership changes per se, we explore changes that lead to a different type of ultimate 
owner or controlling entity
2
. To our knowledge, this is the first paper that analyzes the 
implications of changes in ownership type on the risk-taking behavior of banks
3
 which is an 
issue of major importance for bank stability.  
 Working with a panel of listed and non-listed commercial banks from 17 European 
countries over the 1998-2011 period, we find that banks that experience a change from one 
type of owner to another type do not on average differ significantly in terms of profitability 
and risk when compared to banks with stable ownership type. However, the risk and 
profitability of banks that experience a change in ownership type are significantly affected 
after a change takes place and the type of new owner plays a significant role in explaining the 
observed changes. We find that when the acquirer is a non-financial company, the state or an 
institutional investor, the level of risk increases after the change in the ultimate owner while 
the level of profitability remains unchanged. Conversely, when the acquirer is a bank, we find 
that the level of risk-adjusted profitability decreases. Banks acquired by a different type of 
owner during the global financial crisis do not perform better or worse than they did before.  
 The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the sample and 
the variables used in the study along with descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the 
method used while section 4 shows the results of our econometric investigation. Section 5 
reports robustness checks and discusses further issues. We conclude in section 6.  
                                                 
2
 We do not consider changes for which the owner's type remains the same (i.e. a family-owned bank is taken 
over by another family, a bank controlled by a non-financial firm is controlled by another non-financial firm…). 
Such changes are not expected to alter risk-taking behavior in our framework. Moreover, ownership changes 
where the owner type remains the same are not observed in our data.  
3
 Taboada (2011) investigates the impact of changes in bank ownership structure on the allocation of capital by 
looking into privatization but not the other dimensions of ownership structure.  
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2. Data, definition of variables and descriptive statistics  
 
2.1 Data collection and sample definition 
We take annual data from the Bankscope Fitch IBCA database, which provides 
information on financial statements and ownership structure for financial institutions. We 
identify 1791 commercial banks in 17 European countries, for which financial data is 
available over our 1998-2011 study period. To ensure comparability, other entities such as 
investment banks, savings banks, cooperative banks and other financial intermediaries 
(insurance companies, mortgage houses etc.) are excluded as their regulatory requirements 
differ from those of commercial banks (Perera et al., 2007). 
Among the 1791 commercial banks, only 1237 have information on ownership. Out of 
these banks, 998 have an ultimate owner (controlled banks) while 239 are widely-held (non-
controlled banks). Among the 998 controlled banks, 742 have the same type of owner (stable 
ownership type) while 256 banks have experienced changes in the type of their ultimate 
owner over the study period (see Table 1 for the distribution of banks by country and 
ownership type).  
We also consider a subsample restricted to banks for which financial and ownership 
information is available for at least 7 consecutive years. This allows us to compute some of 
our risk measures which require information 3 years before and 3 years after the changes 
occurred. This subsample consists of 113 banks which experienced a change in their 
ownership type between 2002 and 2008 and 292 banks which did not experience any change 
over the same period. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
2.2 Bank risk and performance measures 
Table 2 provides detailed definitions of all the variables used in our study. We 
consider several measures of bank risk and performance based on accounting data that are 
commonly used in the research literature. We compute two standard measures of asset risk: 
the standard deviation of the return on assets (SDROA) and the standard deviation of the 
return on equity (SDROE) both based on a moving three-year window (for year t we consider 
year t, year t-1 and year t-2). Higher SDROA and SDROE indicate higher risk taking. We also 
consider three credit risk measures: the ratio of non-performing loans to net loans (NPL), the 
ratio of loan loss provisions to net loans (LLP) and the ratio of loan loss reserves to net loans 
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(LLR).To measure bank performance, we use both profitability and risk-adjusted profitability 
variables. We consider both the return on equity (ROE) and the return on assets (ROA) as 
profitability measures. Risk-adjusted profitability variables are defined as the ratio of ROA to 
SDROA denoted AJROA and the ratio of ROE to SDROE denoted AJROE. For our sample of 
banks with unchanged ownership type over the 2002-2010 period, to allow for computation of 
risk measures, we only consider banks that provide at least three consecutive years of data.   
We also compute all our performance and risk variables by considering for each bank 
a three-year window before the ownership type change (i.e. t-1, t-2 and t-3 when the change in 
ownership occurred in t) and a three-year window after the ownership type change (i.e. t+1, 
t+2 and t+3). To allow comparability across time and countries, these values are normalized, 
i.e. divided, by their predicted values which are obtained by regressing each measure (risk and 
performance) on country and time dummies
4
. For example, the normalized standard deviation 
of the return on assets is obtained by dividing the standard deviation by its predicted value 
from the regression.
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The changes in performance and risk for all the variables (D_) are computed as the 
difference between their values on a window three years after the ownership change and a 
window three years before. For risk measures, we compute standard deviations based on 
observations in t+1, t+2 and t+3 and subtract the standard deviations computed on 
observations in t-3, t-2 and t-1. For profitability measures we subtract mean values based on 
observations in t-3, t-2 and t-1 from mean values computed with observations in t+1, t+2 and 
t+3  
 
2.3 Ownership variables 
 
Information on the ownership structure of banks is from Bankscope and individual 
bank websites. A shareholder is considered as the ultimate owner if the two following 
conditions are satisfied: 1) The shareholder holds the largest share with at least 25.01% of 
total shares, and 2) information about at least one other shareholder, who holds less than 25% 
of total shares is known. To identify banks whose ownership type changes, we create a 
dummy variable Change which takes the value of one if the bank experienced a change in the 
type of the ultimate owner between 2002 and 2010 and zero if no change occurs in the type of 
the ultimate owner. If the change occurs more than once over the study period, we consider 
                                                 
4
 The predicted values of our risk and performance measure (Y) are the fitted values derived from equation: 
0 1 2Y Country Year       .  
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the additional change(s) (i.e the second or third change) only when the elapsed time between 
the changes is at least three years and when the owner controls the bank during at least two 
consecutive years. We also consider an alternative measure Change_After, which takes the 
value of one after a change in the type of bank ultimate owner takes place over the 2002-2010 
period and zero before or if no change occurs in the type of the ultimate owner. This is to 
investigate possible differences after the change takes place. We further consider a third 
measure, Before_Change, which is a dummy that takes the value of one before a change in the 
type of bank ultimate owner takes place over the 2002-2010 period and zero after or is zero 
throughout if no change occurs in the type of the ultimate owner. Our aim here is to capture 
possible differences that could explain the change in ownership in the first place. Eventually, 
we consider a fourth  measure Change_Year, a dummy which takes the value of one the year 
when the change occurs for banks which experience a change and zero for banks whose 
ultimate owner type does not change over the study period. This variable allows us to track 
the exact timing of the observed changes.  
In order to capture the changes in the type of the ultimate owner, we consider several 
categories of acquiring owners: banks, individual/family investors, non financial companies, 
states, institutional investors, foreign entities, domestic entities. For each category of 
acquiring owners X, our measure denoted Ch_X is defined as a dummy variable, which takes 
the value one if X became the ultimate owner of a bank that was previously owned by another 
type of owner and zero if otherwise.  For example if X is a bank then Ch_Bank is defined as a 
dummy variable that equals one if a bank became the ultimate owner of a bank that was 
previously owned by either a family, a company, an institutional investor or a state, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
2.4 Control variables  
Several bank-specific control variables are considered. We account for size differences 
by considering the natural logarithm of total assets, LNTA. The relationship between bank size 
and risk is not clear-cut. Larger banks should have greater ability to diversify their asset 
portfolio and therefore be less risky. Nevertheless, because of the presence of too-big-to-fail 
policies, larger banks might have higher incentives than small banks to take more risk. Also, 
large banks appear to be more efficient than small banks, although studies on scale economies 
in the banking industry are inconclusive (Berger and Humphrey, 1997). Moreover, size 
appears to reduce funding costs (McAllister and McManus, 1993; Hughes and Mester, 1993). 
We also account for leverage differences (total equity to total assets ratio, EQUITY).  A well 
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capitalized bank will benefit from lower funding costs because its default risk is perceived as 
lower (Berger, 1995). Furthermore, the risk-shifting incentives induced by deposit insurance 
decreases with the level of capitalization (Brewer and Mondschean, 1994), and hence the 
equity to asset ratio is often used as a proxy for managerial risk preferences (Hughes and 
Mester, 1998). We also control for liquidity differences by using the ratio of liquid assets to 
total assets (LIQUID), diversification differences (net non interest income to total operating 
income, NNII) and managerial efficiency differences (ratio of total operating expenses to total 
operating income, CIR). We further control for possible country-specific effects by including 
country dummies (COUNTRY). Alternatively, we introduce variables to capture the strength 
of supervisory regime (REG) and degree of shareholder protection (SP). To account for 
possible disruptions due to the global financial crisis of 2007-2008, we also include a crisis 
dummy (CRISIS) that takes the value one if the change occurs in the 2007-2008 period and 
zero, if otherwise. To check the robustness of our estimations we also exclude from our 
sample the banks that were rescued during the 2007-2008 financial crisis.  
 
[Insert Table 2] 
 
2.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 presents the distribution of the type of bank ownership changes across all the 
years covered by our sample. We observe a strong heterogeneity among the different types of 
changes within each year, which enables us to analyze implications in terms of bank risk and 
profitability. We observe that the most frequent case is when a bank becomes the ultimate 
owner by replacing another type of entity (Ch_Bank) and the least frequent cases are 
privatization (Ch_Privatization), acquisition by a foreign ultimate owner of a bank previously 
owned by a domestic entity (Ch_Foreign) and acquisition by a domestic ultimate owner of a 
bank previously owned by a foreign entity (Ch_Domestic). Table 3 also shows that the 
number of ownership changes (first column) increases from 4 in 2004 to 74 in 2009 and falls 
to 34 in 2010.  
 
 [Insert Table 3] 
 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the bank risk and performance variables and in 
addition those of the bank-specific variables. In panel A, we present the descriptive statistics 
for the full sample available in Bankscope and for the subsample of non-controlled and 
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controlled banks while in panel B, we present statistics for banks with stable ownership type, 
with changing ownership type and the latter with reported ownership and financial data for 7 
consecutive years. The general descriptive statistics reported in panel B show that banks 
whose owner's type did not change exhibit lower asset risk (SDROA, SDROE) but higher 
credit risk (NPL) and are more profitable (ROA, ROE) than banks whose ultimate owners 
changed from one type to another type. On the whole, we observe that banks whose ultimate 
owners did not change from one category to another were seemingly better able to manage 
their risk by achieving higher risk-adjusted profitability (ADJROA, ADJROE). We do not 
find, however, differences for banks with different business models (LOANS, DEPOSIT, 
NNII), leverage (EQUITY) and different managerial efficiency (CIR). 
 
[Insert Table 4] 
 
 In Table 5, we examine the risk and profitability profiles for banks which experienced 
a change in the type of their ultimate owner and provide indicators computed after (Column 
A) and before (Column B) the ownership change. The table shows the indicators for the 113 
banks that experienced changes in ownership type and subsamples based on the 10 types of 
changes for our variables of interest. The level of risk (SDROA, SDROE) is on average higher 
after the change occurs. However, the level of profitability (ROA) is lower after the ownership 
change. We also find significant differences in terms of risk-adjusted return (ADJROA and 
ADJROE) before and after the changes. On the whole, we observe that changes in the type of 
the ultimate owner are associated with higher levels of risk-taking without increasing the level 
of profitability or returns. The results are mainly driven by banks which are acquired by a 
non-financial firm (Ch_Company) and to lesser extent by banks falling under the control of 
governments (Ch_State) and institutional investors (Ch_Institut). When we consider the risk 
and performance profiles of banks that experienced a change in the type of the ultimate 
owner, as in Table 5, but without normalizing the variables of interest, the results remain 
unchanged and are even stronger for the full sample. 
 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
In table 6, we report the descriptive statistics of the changes in bank risk/performance 
after and before the changes in the ultimate owner type. Table 6 reports that more than 50 
percent of the European commercial banks that have experienced a change in the type of their 
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ultimate owner exhibit a higher level of risk after the change while their profitability and risk-
adjusted profitability decreases. On average risk increases by 0.86 percent when using 
D_SDROA and 0.30 when considering D_SROE after the changes while D_ROA drops by 
1.36% and D_ROE by 0.40% after the changes. The table also shows high heterogeneity in 
the risk/performance of such banks when looking at the standard deviations while the lowest 
performance quartile is -1.44 for D_ROA and -0.77 for D_ROE respectively. This suggests 
that although, on average, risk increases and profitability decreases after the changes in 
ultimate owner's type (three-year window), some banks appear to fare worse or are more 
affected than others. This cross variation in the change in risk allows to test whether changes 
in ownership characteristics affect bank risk taking behavior and performance strategies and if 
the nature of the acquiring owner matters in such a relationship.  
   
[Insert Table 6] 
 
3.  Econometric Methodology  
  
This paper examines how changes in the owner's type of European banks affect their 
risk taking behavior and performance. In this section, we present an econometric analysis that 
addresses three key questions: 
1.  Are there differences in terms of risk and profitability among banks which 
were acquired by a different type of owner over the 2002-2010 period and 
banks which were continuously owned by the same type of owner?  
2. Are there differences in risk before and after the change in the type of the 
ultimate owner for banks that experienced a change in the type of owner?  
3. Does the type of the acquiring owner (bank, individual/ family, non-financial 
company, institutional investor, foreign entity, domestic entity) matter in 
explaining changes in bank risk taking? 
First, to test whether banks with a stable ownership type behave differently in terms of 
risk and performance than banks that experience a change in ownership type, we estimate the 
model given by equation (1): 
 
                        0 1 .it it itY Change ControlVariables                                 (1) 
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Where itY  is either a performance or a risk measure computed on the basis of a three-year 
rolling window (for each year t we consider t, t-1 and t-2). Performance is measured either by 
profitability (ROA, ROE) or risk-adjusted profitability (AJROA, AJROE). Risk is measured by 
either SDROA, SDROE, LLP, NPL or LLR. The change variable (Change) is a dummy that 
takes the value one if the type of the bank ultimate owner changes over the 2002-2010 period, 
and zero if otherwise. We also consider an alternative measure Change_After which takes the 
value of one after a change in the type of the ultimate owner takes place over the 2002-2010 
period and zero before or if no change occurs in the type of the ultimate owner. We further 
consider a third measure Before_Change, a dummy which takes the value of one before a 
change in the type of bank ultimate owner takes place over the 2002-2010 period and zero 
after or if no change occurs in the type of the ultimate owner. ControlVariables is a vector of 
bank specific variables or country level variables as described in Table 2.  
Second, we estimate equation (2) to analyze whether changes in ownership type lead 
to changes in the level of risk/performance. 
 
                          0 1_ _ .it it itD Z Change Year ControlVariables                              (2) 
Where _ itD Z  is either the difference between the average level of profitability over the 3 
years subsequent to the change (t+1, t+2, t+3) and the average profitability 3 years before (t-1, 
t-2, t-3) or the difference between risk and risk-adjusted profitability on a three-year window 
after and a three-year window before. In equation (2), the means and standard deviations are 
computed on the basis of t+1, t+2 and t+3 (after) and t-1, t-2 and t-3 (before).  A positive 
value of 1  indicates higher risk/performance after a change in the type of the ultimate owner 
and in contrast, a negative value indicates lower risk/performance after a change in the type of 
the ultimate owner. We note that there is one measure of _D Z  for each bank i which 
experienced a change in ultimate owner type over our study period. For banks with the same 
type of ultimate owner throughout our study period, the calculation of the change in risk 
taking/performance is similar to _D Z  i.e the difference between the means (and standards 
deviations) of our profitability/ risk measure on a three-year window after (for year t we 
consider year t+1, year t+2 and year t+3) and on a three-year window before (for year t we 
consider year t-3, year t-2 and year t-1). For banks whose ownership type never changes, the 
dependent variable is annually introduced in the model based on the difference between the 
means (and standards deviations) of our profitability/ risk measure on a three-year window 
12 
 
after (for year t we consider year t+1, year t+2 and year t+3) and on a three-year window 
before (for year t we consider year t-3, year t-2 and year t-1).  Consequently, our 
Change_Year dummy takes the value of one the year when the change occurs for banks which 
experience a change and zero for banks whose ultimate owner type does not change over the 
study period.  
Third, we also investigate whether the nature of the change in the ultimate owner's type 
influences banks’ risk taking behavior and performance strategies differently according to the 
type of the acquiring ultimate owner.  For this purpose, we use the model shown in equation 
(3):
6
  
 
                 
0 1 2 3 4
5
_ _ _ _ _
_ .
it
it
D Z Ch Bank CH Family CH Insitut CH State
CH Company ControlVariables
    
  
    
  
                  (3)  
4. Results 
 
We use panel estimation techniques with random specific effects to estimate equation 
(1). The results are presented in Table 7. We do not find any significant difference between 
the two types of banks when considering performance, risk and risk-adjusted profitability 
measures throughout the sample period (Change). However, when considering the 
Change_After variable we find that banks which experience a change in ownership type 
exhibit higher risk (SDROA) than other banks while their risk-adjusted profitability (AJROA) 
is lower (although at 10 % significance level only). Hence, banks whose ownership type 
changes appear to be riskier than other banks but only after the change takes place. Moreover, 
such a difference cannot be observed before the changes take place as indicated by the 
absence of any significance of the Before_Change variable. Hence, changes in ownership type 
can apparently not be explained by differences in risk or by lower profitability and/or risk-
adjusted profitability and hence by their ability or not to optimize their portfolio risk-return.  
 
  [Insert Table 7] 
                                                 
6
 There is some overlap between ownership type change and controlling country change (Foreign vs. Domestic).  
Therefore, in order to avoid singularity, we remove Ch_bank_private, Ch_privatization, Family_Ch, 
Ch_Domestic, Ch_Foreign in the estimates of equation (3). That is, we consider only 5 types of ownership 
changes instead of the 10 types described in Table 2.  
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We use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS) to estimate Equations (2) and (3) corrected 
for heteroskedasticity following White’s methodology. The results are presented in Table 8. 
The regression findings show differences in bank risk-taking (asset risk) following the change 
in the ultimate owner's type. Our result indicates that while banks which experienced a change 
in the type of entity that controls them are more risky after the change than before (D_SROA 
and D_SROE), they are not found to perform better after the change takes place. They are 
even performing more poorly than before as indicated by the negative sign of the coefficients 
of the change in ROA (D_ROA) and of the change in risk adjusted profitability (D_AJROA), 
respectively, (although at the 10% significance level only). Such results highlight that such 
banks engage in riskier activities are not eventually rewarded by higher profitability.  
When considering equation (3), we find that the nature of the acquirer matters in 
explaining the changes in profitability and risk. When the acquirer is a non-financial company 
(Ch_Company) or an institutional investor (Ch_Institut), the level of risk increases while the 
level of profitability and risk-adjusted profitability remains unchanged. Moreover, when the 
acquirer is the state, the level of risk increases while the level of profitability measured by 
D_ROA decreases (although at the 10% level only). We do not find any significant difference 
in terms of risk and profitability after a family acquires a bank. Moreover, when the acquirer 
is another bank, the results show that the level of risk-adjusted profitability decreases after the 
change in the type of the ultimate owner. These results are consistent with our hypothesis that 
a change in the type of the ultimate owner is associated with changes in risk-taking behavior 
and/or performance strategies depending on the nature of the acquiring owner.  
 
  [Insert Table 8] 
  
5. Robustness check and further issues 
In this section, we check the robustness of our regression results and examine further 
issues.
7
 First, we focus on the subsample of 113 banks that allows us to isolate the banks 
which fell under the control of a different type of ultimate owner and for which the data is 
reported exhaustively for at least 7 years. When focusing on this subsample, the results 
regarding our variables of interest remain identical. We find that when the acquirer is a non-
                                                 
7
  Estimates for the robustness tests which are not shown here are available from the authors on request.  
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financial company, a state or an institutional investor the level of risk increases after the 
changes in the type of the ultimate owner.  
Second, we run separate regressions introducing our ownership change variables one 
by one along with the control variables on the full sample. The results for our main variables 
of interest remain unchanged. In addition, we run separate regressions introducing our 
ownership change variables one by one along with the control variables on the subsample of 
113 banks. The results regarding our main variables of interest still hold except when a bank 
is acquired/controlled by another bank. We find that, when the acquirer is another bank, the 
level of risk decreases while profitability increases (although at the 10% level only) after the 
change in the type of the ultimate owner. Such a result is consistent with the views that banks 
as acquirers are better in managing risk because of their comparative advantage in risk 
management compared with other acquirers.  
Third, we further investigate whether the global financial crisis affects the relationship 
between changes in owner’s type and risk. For this purpose, we interact our changes in 
ownership type variables with CRISIS in equations (2) and (3). Alternatively, we estimate 
equations (2) and (3) on a subsample limited to the years 2007 and 2008. Our results indicate 
that, during the crisis, banks which switch from one type of owner to another do not perform 
better or worse than they did before (see table 9). To check for robustness, we exclude from 
our estimations the banks that were rescued
8
 during the global financial crisis of 2007-2008. 
The results regarding our variables of interest remain identical.  
  
6. Conclusion 
The objective of this paper was threefold: first, to analyze whether banks that are 
acquired by an entity of a different type than the one in place before acquisition (bank, 
individual/ family, non-financial company, institutional investor, foreign entity, domestic 
entity)  behave differently, in terms of risk and performance, than banks whose owner's  type 
remains identical ; second to examine whether the risk and performance of banks whose 
owner's type changes are different before and after the change ; and third to examine the role 
played by the type of the acquirer and the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 on the 
relationship between changes in owner type and changes in risk and performance.  
Working with a panel of European commercial banks, we do not find significant 
differences in terms of risk and risk-adjusted profitability between banks with changing 
                                                 
8
 Due to limited observations, we are not able to run the regressions on the rescued banks solely. The information 
on rescued banks comes from Petrovic and Tutsch (2009). 
15 
 
ownership type and those characterized by stable ownership type. However, after the change 
occurs, banks which experience a change in ownership type take more risk without increasing 
their profitability. This suggests that although such banks engage in riskier activities, they are 
not eventually rewarded with higher profits.  
Analyzing whether the nature of the acquirer matters in explaining the changes in 
profitability and risk, we find that when the acquirer is a financial company, the state or an 
institutional investor, the level of risk increases but profitability is unaffected after the change 
takes places. Conversely, when the acquirer is another bank, we find that the level of risk-
adjusted profitability decreases after the change in the type of ultimate owner. Our findings 
indicate that the type of the acquirer matters in explaining changes in profitability and risk.  
Looking more closely at the changes that occurred during the global financial crisis 
(2007 and 2008) we find that banks that were acquired by a different type of owner do not 
perform better or worse than they did before.  
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Table 1. Distribution of European commercial banks by country over the 1998-2011 period   
 
Country 
Full sample of 
commercial 
banks in 
BankScope 
Our sample of 
commercial 
bank 
Not-
controlled 
banks 
Controlled 
banks 
Stable 
ownership 
type banks 
Changing 
ownership 
type  banks 
Austria 91 70 18 52 30 22 
Belgium 56 34 7 27 19 8 
Denmark 68 17 6 11 8 3 
Finland 12 7 2 5 4 1 
France 241 192 40 152 116 36 
Germany 249 183 42 141 97 44 
Greece 20 16 4 12 8 4 
Ireland 44 36 9 27 23 4 
Italy 216 137 14 123 105 18 
Luxembourg 125 96 16 80 58 22 
Netherlands 55 44 11 33 16 17 
Norway 24 10 1 9 7 2 
Portugal 34 20 2 18 13 5 
Spain 99 64 19 45 33 12 
Sweden 27 13 2 11 10 1 
Switzerland 218 136 25 111 88 23 
United 
Kingdom 
212 162 21 141 107 34 
TOTAL 1791 1237 239 998 742 256 
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Table 2.  Variables definitions  
Variables Definition   
Dependent variables 
ROA 
ROE 
SDROA 
 
SDROE 
 
NPL 
LLP  
LLR 
AJROA 
AJROE 
D_ROA 
 
 
D_ROE 
 
 
D_SDROA 
 
 
D_SDROE 
 
 
D_AJROA 
 
 
D_AJROE 
 
 
 
Return on Average Assets  
Return on Average Equity  
Standard deviation of return on assets' rolling window over 3 years (current 
year and 2 previous consecutive years) 
Standard deviation of  return on assets' rolling window over 3 years (current 
year and 2 previous consecutive years) 
The ratio of Nonperforming loans to Net Loans  
The ratio of Loan Loss Provision to Net Loans  
The ratio of Loan Loss Reserves to Net Loans  
ROA/SDROA  
ROE/SDROE 
Changes in ROA which equal the difference between the average level of   
ROA over the 3 years after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and 
the average ROA 3 years before (t-3, t-2, t-1).  
Changes in ROE which equal the difference between the average level of 
ROE 3 years after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and the 
average level of ROE 3 years before (t-3, t-2, t-1).   
 Changes in SDROA which equal the difference between the SDROA 3 years 
after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and 3 years before (t-3, t-
2, t-1).   
Changes in SDROE which equal the difference between the SDROE 3 years 
after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and 3 years before (t-3, t-
2, t-1).   
Changes in AJROA which equal the difference between the AJROA 3 years 
after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and 3 years before (t-3, t-
2, t-1).   
Changes in AJROE which equal the difference between the AJROE 3 years 
after changes in the ultimate owner (t+1, t+2, t+3) and 3 years before (t-3, t-
2, t-1). 
 
 Banks ownership variables  
Change 
 
Before_change  
 
Change_After 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the type of bank ultimate owner changed 
at least once between 2002 & 2010, and zero otherwise.  
A dummy variable that equals 1 before a change in the type of bank ultimate 
owner over 2002-2010 period and zero otherwise. 
A dummy variable that equals 1 after a change in  the type of bank ultimate 
owner over  2002-2010 period and zero otherwise 
 
Change_Year A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 the year when the change occurs 
for banks which experience a change and zero for banks whose ultimate 
owner type does not change over the study period. 
 
Ch_Bank A dummy variable that equals 1 if bank became the ultimate owner of a 
bank that was previously owned by either family, non-financial company, 
institutional investor or state, and zero otherwise.  
 
Ch_bank_private A dummy variable that equals 1 if bank became the ultimate owner of a 
bank that was previously owned by another private shareholder (non state 
owned), and zero otherwise.  
 
Ch_Family A dummy variable that equals 1 if bank became the ultimate owner of a 
bank that was previously owned by either bank, non-financial company, 
institutional investor or state, and zero otherwise.  
 
Family_Ch A dummy variable that equals 1 if family  owned bank is acquired by 
another type of owner, and zero otherwise.  
 
Ch_State A dummy variable that equals 1 if bank became the ultimate owner of  a 
bank that was previously owned by either bank, non-financial company, 
institutional investor or family, and zero otherwise.  
 
Ch_Privatization A dummy variable that equals 1 if state owned bank is acquired by another 
type of owner, and zero otherwise.  
 
Ch_Company A dummy variable that equals 1 if non-financial company  became the  
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ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by either bank, state, 
institutional investor or family , and zero otherwise  
Ch_Institut A dummy variable that equals 1 if bank  became the ultimate owner  of  a 
bank that was previously owned by either bank, non-financial company,  
state or family , and  zero otherwise  
 
Ch_Foreign A dummy variable that equals 1 if foreign investor(s) became the ultimate 
owner(s)  of  a bank that was previously domestic-owned , and zero 
otherwise  
 
Ch_Domestic A dummy variable that equals 1 if  domestic-owned  bank became the 
ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously foreign-owned , and zero 
otherwise  
 
Bank-level variables 
LNTA Logarithm of total assets  
LIQUID Ratio of liquid asset to total assets   
EQUITY Ratio of equity to total assets   
CIR Cost to income ratio  
NNII Ratio non-interest income to total operating income   
 
Country-level and 
other variables  
  
CRISIS 
 
REG 
Dummy equal to one if the  changes occur in 2007 and 2008  and Zero 
otherwise 
Index measuring the strength of supervisory regime. The yes/no responses to 
the following questions are coded as 1/0: (1) Does the supervisory agency 
have the right to meet with external auditors to discuss their report without 
the approval of the bank? (2) Are auditors required by law to communicate 
directly to the supervisory agency any presumed involvement of bank 
directors or senior managers in elicit activities, fraud, or insider abuse? (3) 
Can supervisors take legal action against external auditors for negligence? 
(4) Can the supervisory authority force a bank to change its internal 
organizational structure? (5) Are off-balance sheet items disclosed to 
supervisors? (6) Can the supervisory agency order the bank’s directors or 
management to constitute provisions to cover actual or potential losses? (7) 
Can the supervisory agency suspend directors’ decision to distribute: (a) 
Dividends? (b) Bonuses? (c) Management fees? (8) Can the supervisory 
agency legally declare-such that this declaration supersedes the rights of 
bank shareholders-that a bank is insolvent? (9) Does the Banking Law give 
authority to the supervisory agency to intervene that is, suspend some or all 
ownership rights-a problem bank? And (10) Regarding bank restructuring 
and reorganization, can the supervisory agency or any other government 
agency do the following: (a) Supersede shareholder rights? (b) Remove and 
replace management? (c) Remove and replace directors? A higher value 
indicates wider and stronger authority for bank supervisors. Source: Barth et 
al. (2006, 2009) 
 
 
SP SP is an index of anti-director rights for the country and is ranged from 0 for 
the country with the greatest shareholder right to 6 for the poorest right. The 
index is added one point when (a) the country allows shareholders to mail 
their proxy vote; (b) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares 
prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting; (c)cumulative voting or 
proportional representation of minorities on the board of directors is 
allowed; (d) an oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (e) the 
minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call for an 
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting is less than or equal to 10 percent (the 
sample median); or (f) when shareholders have preemptive rights that can 
only be waived by a shareholders meeting. Source: Djankov et al. (2008) 
 
 
SOURCE: All variables are the authors’ calculations from Banksource data 
except where indicated. 
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Table 3. Distribution of changes in ownership type  
 
YEAR Change Ch_Bank Ch_bank_private Family_Ch Ch_Family Ch_Company Ch_State Ch_Institut Ch_Privatization Ch_Foreign Ch_Domestic 
2001 
           2002 15 2 2 0 4 2 2 3 0 4 0 
2003 14 6 5 1 0 2 3 1 1 1 0 
2004 4 1 1 1 1 1 4 1 0 0 1 
2005 53 30 26 7 4 9 0 3 4 3 3 
2006 62 25 22 10 8 23 1 3 6 5 3 
2007 73 26 24 12 7 16 8 16 3 3 2 
2008 36 5 5 4 3 8 11 4 1 3 3 
2009 74 26 23 6 11 10 16 11 7 5 2 
2010 34 9 5 3 2 13 8 2 5 0 1 
Total 365 130 113 44 40 84 53 44 27 24 15 
Variable definitions :  Change= dummy variable that equal 1 if the type of bank ultimate owner changed at least once between 2002 & 2010, and zero otherwise ; Ch_Bank: a bank became the ultimate 
owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of entity (either family, company, institutional investor or state); Ch_bank_private: a bank became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that 
was previously owned by another  private  shareholder (non state owned); Family_Ch : a family became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; 
Ch_Family: a family-owned bank is acquired by another type of owner; Ch_Company: non-financial company  became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of 
owner; Ch_State: state  became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; Ch_Institut: institutional investor  became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that 
was previously owned by another type of owner; Ch_Privatization:  state-owned bank is acquired by another type of owner.;Ch_Foreign: foreign investor(s) became the ultimate owner(s)  of  a 
bank that was previously domestic-owned; Ch_Domestic: domestic-owned  bank became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously foreign-owned.  
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics for European commercial banks, average over the 1998-2011 period  
 
LOANS DEP EQUTIY CIR LLP NPL ROA ROE LIQUID OBS ASSETS NII NNII SDROA SDROE AJROA AJROE  
Panel A .  Full sample  
Full sample of commercial banks available in Bankscope (1791 banks) 
Mean 47,55 70,65 13,748 67,156 0,834 4,886 0,752 7,576 29,359 33,4264 22421,46 57,056 42,645 0,757 5,572 5,623 6,6324 
STD 99,97 99,23 100 300 75 71,43 73,01 98,46 158,92 13117,6 2202423 296,05 282,47 55,2 82,71 441,9 3514,2 
Our sample of commercial banks (1237) 
Mean 46,73 71,34 12,49 64,66 0,85 4,47 0,90 8,65 30,72 32,55 24285,82 54,82 44,96 0,73 5,84 5,25 6,69 
STD 30,11 22,36 15,32 28,98 4,36 6,35 3,14 14,83 28,03 137,59 113962,30 34,26 34,02 2,09 7,79 12,92 58,36 
Controlled  banks (998 banks) 
Mean 47,39 70,89 12,15 63,74 0,88 4,25 0,89 8,79 30,65 32,71 27994,72 55,19 44,61 0,65 5,63 5,36 7,25 
STD 30,17 22,41 14,96 28,64 4,20 6,25 3,00 14,64 28,04 146,19 125500,40 34,82 33,95 1,74 7,36 12,52 67,12 
Not controlled banks (239 banks)  
Mean 54,44 67,70 14,13 67,82 0,92 3,31 0,69 6,41 23,35 31,24 49892,31 59,25 40,75 0,76 5,16 6,44 7,49 
STD 99,95 98,21 100,00 300,00 66,30 29,38 19,25 83,33 100,00 2060,53 2202423,00 296,05 177,68 22,14 71,35 169,74 548,07 
Panel B. Stable and  changing ownership type banks  
Stable ownership type banks (742 banks) 
Mean 47,63 70,82 12,67 62,61 0,74 4,28 0,99 9,15 31,47 35,02 23100,11 55,61 44,39 0,58 5,19 5,49 5,41 
STD 99,94 97,75 100,00 270,71 60,94 65,31 60,26 98,46 100,00 5888,63 2150536,00 282,28 224,08 15,84 71,90 266,09 455,93 
changing ownership type   banks (256 banks) 
Mean 46,06 69,82 12,00 69,06 0,85 3,25 0,66 7,43 29,93 24,85 29440,36 50,75 48,07 0,78 7,40 4,08 6,77 
STD 28,85 22,77 12,43 33,77 4,02 3,93 2,56 18,95 26,57 85,35 123928,00 39,45 34,71 1,24 9,55 9,24 32,68 
 
changing ownership type   banks with 7 consecutive years  (113  banks) 
Mean 44,21 70,70 11,37 62,04 0,56 3,07 1,21 10,85 32,23 24,94 14675,24 55,90 44,10 0,61 5,28 4,48 12,59 
STD 28,21 23,17 11,27 26,65 2,03 4,18 2,44 15,59 28,65 44,12 65742,77 31,44 31,44 0,94 7,30 4,85 51,98 
 
 
 
 
 
 Variable definitions (all variables are expressed in percentage except ASSETS  which is in million of euros): LOANS = net loans/total assets; DEP = deposits/total assets; EQUITY = equity/total 
assets; CIR = total operating expenses/total operating income; LLP = loan loss provision/net loans;  NPL= non performing loans/net loans; ROA = return on average assets; ROE = return on 
average equity; LIQUID = liquid assets/total assets;  OBS = off balance sheet/ total assets;  TA = total assets (millions Euros); NII= net interest income/ total operating income; NNII=net non 
interest income/total operating income;  SDROA= standard deviation of the  3-year rolling windows ROA; SDROE = standard deviation of the of the  3-year rolling windows ROE; AJROA= 
ROA/SDROA; AJROE= ROE/SDROE. 
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Table 5. Risk and performance: three-year windows before (A) and after (B) the change  
RISK  Change_Year Ch_Bank Ch_bank_private Family_Ch Ch_Family Ch_Company Ch_State Ch_Institut Ch_Privatization Ch_Foreign Ch_Domestic 
 A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B A B 
SDROA(a,b)  
1,67 0,81 1,68 0 ,81 1,75 0,81 1,16 0,87 1,40 1,28 1,88 0,72 1,85 0,80 1,54 0,51 3,12 0,74 0,84 0,51 2,17 0,28 
1,87* 
0,75 0,76 0,63 0,13 2,19** 1,81* 1,90* 1,33 1,39 3,06** 
SDROE(a,b) 
1,13 0 ,82 0,80 0,82 0,82 0,79 1,34 1,09 0,88 1,11 1,51 0,66 1,46 0,86 1,49 0,83 0,97 0,88 1,79 1,08 1,40 0,41 
1,83* -0,10 0,15 0,38 -0,40 2,07** 1,43 1,15 0,10 0,68 1,56 
ROA(a,b) 
0,61 1 ,97 0,89 0 ,66 0,87 0,68 1,57 6,50 0,82 0,16 0,30 3,84 0,14 1,81 
-
0,23 
3,90 -0,66 0,29 
-
1,55 
1,00 0,29 -1,73 
-2,04** 0,52 0,41 -1,22 0,43 -1,76* -1,63 -1,51 -0,85 -1,33 0,80 
ROE(a,b) 
0,72 1,10 1 ,05 1,07 1,06 1,11 1,38 1,51 0,23 0,10 0,64 1,13 0,34 1,15 0,16 2,01 0,33 0,29 
-
1,09 
0,81 0,71 1,10 
-1,55 -0,04 -0,11 -0,19 0,18 -1,82* -1,49 -1,14 0,11 -0,80 --0,55 
AJROA(a,b) 
0,61 1,30 0,75 1,85 0,78 1,98 0,48 1,29 0,46 0,78 0,54 0,88 0,28 1,09 0,59 1,36 0,26 0,19 0,11 1,62 0,13 2,13 
-2,72*** -2,01** -2,08** -1,31 -0,89 -0,70 -1,92* -1,45 0,47 -1,22 -2 ,27* 
AJROE(a,b) 
1,06 1, 36 1,71 1 ,94 1,79 2,05 1,15 2,51 0,62 0,67 0,95 1,44 0,22 0,52 0,33 1,08 0,53 0,39 0,71 0,47 0,32 1,53 
-0,61 -0,19 -0,20 -1,03 -0,13 -0,68 -0,91 -1,12 0,55 0,55 -0,99 
A : before the change in ownership type; B: after the change in ownership type. 
Variable definitions : SDROA(a,b)= standard deviation of ROA 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change; SDROE(a,b) = standard deviation of ROE 3 years  after the change and 3 years before 
the change ;  ROA(a,b) = return on average assets; ROE(a,b) = return on average equity ; AJROA(a,b)= ROA(a,b)/SDROA(a,b); AJROE(a,b)= ROE(a,b)/SDROE(a,b); Change_Year=  dummy variable that 
takes the value of 1 the year when the change occurs for banks which experience a change and zero for banks whose ultimate owner type does not change over the study period.;  Ch_bank is a dummy variable that is 
equal to one if a bank acquired a bank that was previously owned by another type of shareholder and zero otherwise;  Ch_Bank: a bank became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned 
by another type of entity (either family, company, institutional investor or state); Ch_bank_private: a bank became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another  private  
shareholder (non state owned; Family_Ch : a family became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; Ch_Family: a family-owned bank is acquired by 
another type of owner; Ch_Company: non-financial company  became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; Ch_State: state  became the ultimate 
owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; Ch_Institut: institutional investor  became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of 
owner; Ch_Privatization:  state-owned bank is acquired by another type of owner.;Ch_Foreign: foreign investor(s) became the ultimate owner(s)  of  a bank that was previously domestic-owned; 
Ch_Domestic: domestic-owned  bank became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously foreign-owned.  
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Table 6. Descriptive statistics on the change in bank performance and risk for banks with a change in ownership type  
stats D_SDROA D_SDROE D_ROA D_ROE D_AJROA D_AJROE 
mean 0,86 0,30 -1,36 -0,40 -0,67 -0,30 
p50 0,08 -0,01 -0,16 -0,18 -0,31 -0,09 
p25 -0,08 -0,39 -1,44 -0,77 -1,17 -0,54 
p75 0,81 0,79 0,57 0,36 0,24 0,30 
sd 4,71 1,40 6,59 2,06 2,41 2,77 
min -9,44 -4,33 -57,05 -14,16 -13,48 -18,16 
max 45,79 5,97 12,32 6,17 10,99 11,02 
N 113 108 113 108 108 103 
Variable definitions : D_SDROA= difference between the  standard deviation of ROA 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change; D_SDROE= = difference between the  standard deviation of 
ROE 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change ;  D_ROA = difference between the  return on average assets 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change; D_ROE = difference  
between the return on average equity 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change; D_AJROA)= difference  between  AJROA 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change ; 
D_AJROE= difference  between  AJROE 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change. 
  
 
 
Table 7 Stable and changing ownership type and risk/performance, Equation (1) 
          
 ROA ROE SDROA SDROE AJROA AJROE NPL LLP LLR 
   Change -0.180 -0.692 0.116 0.364 -0.630 8.349 0.0976 0.0853 1.907 
 (-1.19) (-0.88) (1.51) (0.82) (-0.78) (1.17) (0.13) (0.39) (1.43) 
   Before_change 0.0409 0.224 -0.0234 -0.326 0.564 13.65 0.661 0.402 2.397
*
 
 (0.26) (0.23) (-0.24) (-0.48) (0.62) (0.93) (1.26) (0.87) (1.75) 
Change_After -0.0917 -0.872 0.174** 0.725 -1.561* 0.0176 -0.558 -0.293 -0.453 
 (-0.56) (-0.82) (2.47) (1.08) (-1.76) (0.00) (-1.16) (-0.89) (-0.45) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 2073 2066 1737 1724 1720 1706 779 1792 257 
Variable definitions:  Change= dummy variable that equal 1 if the type of bank ultimate owner changed at least once between 2002 & 2010, and zero otherwise ;Before_ Change =  dummy variable that 
equal 1 before a change in  the type of bank ultimate owner over 2002-2010 period and zero otherwise;  Change_After =  dummy variable that equal 1 after a change in  the type of bank ultimate owner 
over 2002-2010 period and zero otherwise;  ROA = return on average assets; ROE= return on average equity; SDROA= standard deviation of the  3-year rolling windows ROA; SDROE = standard deviation 
of the of the  3-year rolling windows ROE; AJROA= ROA/SDROA; AJROE= ROE/SDROE; LLP = loan loss provision/net loans;  NPL= non performing loans/net loans; LLR= loan loss reserve/net loans; 
Controls  is a vector of bank specific variables or country level variables. 
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Table 8.The impact of changes of ownership type on risk/performance, Equations (2) and (3)  
 (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) 
 D_SROA D_SROA D_SROE D_SROE D_ROA D_ROA D_ROE D_ROE D_AJROA D_AJROA D_AJROE D_AJROE 
Change_Year 0.931
*
  0.479
***
  -1.401
*
  -0.000765  -0.581
*
  -0.0230  
 (1.72)  (2.95)  (-1.71)  (-0.00)  (-1.67)  (-0.06)  
Ch_Bank  1.112  0.0142  0.0522  0.223  -1.318
**
  0.267 
  (0.77)  (0.08)  (0.08)  (0.42)  (-2.05)  (0.49) 
Ch_Family  0.276  0.162  -0.346  0.561  -0.238  -0.0110 
  (0.42)  (0.86)  (-0.39)  (0.87)  (-0.81)  (-0.02) 
Ch_Company  0.822
**
  1.045
***
  -3.123  -0.302  -0.0253  -0.219 
  (2.30)  (2.67)  (-1.30)  (-0.72)  (-0.04)  (-0.23) 
Ch_State  1.074
**
  0.824
*
  -1.929
*
  0.148  -0.499  -0.154 
  (2.14)  (1.66)  (-1.86)  (0.14)  (-0.97)  (-0.37) 
ch_invest  1.475
***
  0.990
*
  -3.824  -1.155  -0.417  -0.836 
  (2.71)  (1.94)  (-1.33)  (-0.56)  (-0.61)  (-1.01) 
LIQUID -0.00324 -0.00297 -0.000466 -0.0000934 0.000786 -0.000448 0.00353 0.00306 -0.000913 -0.000898 0.00206 0.00196 
 (-1.07) (-0.95) (-0.23) (-0.04) (0.10) (-0.06) (0.85) (0.75) (-0.21) (-0.20) (0.69) (0.66) 
NNII -0.0107 -0.0110 -0.00115 -0.00159 -0.00948 -0.00764 0.0170 0.0178 0.00842 0.00811 -0.00262 -0.00232 
 (-1.59) (-1.61) (-0.42) (-0.58) (-0.51) (-0.41) (1.42) (1.46) (1.43) (1.34) (-0.40) (-0.34) 
EQUITY 0.0346
**
 0.0346
**
 0.00443 0.00435 -0.0339
*
 -0.0338
*
 -0.0307 -0.0309 -0.00786 -0.00792 0.0149 0.0148 
 (2.01) (2.00) (1.03) (1.02) (-1.91) (-1.91) (-1.64) (-1.64) (-1.08) (-1.09) (1.47) (1.46) 
LNTA 0.0899 0.0891 0.0714
**
 0.0745
**
 -0.334 -0.343 -0.589 -0.591 -0.0927 -0.0887 -0.00851 -0.0106 
 (1.09) (1.06) (2.19) (2.29) (-1.31) (-1.34) (-1.56) (-1.57) (-1.30) (-1.23) (-0.06) (-0.07) 
CIR 0.00649 0.00658 -0.000310 -0.0000782 0.0204 0.0197 -0.00263 -0.00290 0.00416 0.00426 0.00572
*
 0.00566 
 (0.77) (0.78) (-0.10) (-0.03) (1.45) (1.38) (-0.55) (-0.59) (1.34) (1.37) (1.69) (1.64) 
CRISIS -0.0219 -0.0235 -0.0525 -0.0571 -0.186 -0.172 0.588 0.592 0.0966 0.0952 -0.181 -0.181 
 (-0.32) (-0.33) (-1.54) (-1.64) (-0.51) (-0.46) (1.26) (1.25) (0.58) (0.56) (-1.18) (-1.17) 
SP -0.0125 -0.0147 -0.0417
*
 -0.0437
**
 0.0220 0.0257 0.0402 0.0401 -0.0272 -0.0253 0.00173 0.00177 
 (-0.29) (-0.34) (-1.93) (-2.00) (0.47) (0.54) (0.86) (0.86) (-0.43) (-0.40) (0.04) (0.04) 
REG -0.0447 -0.0506 -0.0396 -0.0624 -0.550 -0.465 -1.647
**
 -1.622
**
 -0.739
**
 -0.757
**
 0.227 0.246 
 (-0.20) (-0.23) (-0.39) (-0.61) (-0.80) (-0.68) (-2.25) (-2.20) (-2.50) (-2.53) (0.72) (0.77) 
_cons -0.616 -0.580 0.183 0.208 2.951
**
 2.874
**
 0.589 0.574 0.186 0.162 0.145 0.152 
 (-0.66) (-0.61) (0.45) (0.51) (2.12) (2.05) (0.71) (0.69) (0.18) (0.16) (0.17) (0.17) 
r2 0.0320 0.0330 0.0204 0.0305 0.0145 0.0175 0.0228 0.0230 0.0138 0.0153 0.00913 0.00972 
N 944 944 927 927 944 944 927 927 928 928 910 910 
Variable definitions : D_SDROA= difference between the  standard deviation of ROA 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change; D_SDROE= = difference between the  standard deviation of ROE 3 years  after the 
change and 3 years before the change ;  D_ROA = difference between the  return on average assets 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change; D_ROEA = difference  between the return on average equity 3 years  after the 
change and 3 years before the change; D_AJROA= difference  between  AJROA 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change ; D_AJROE= difference  between  AJROE 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the 
change; Change_Year=  dummy variable that takes the value of 1 the year when the change occurs for banks which experience a change and zero for banks whose ultimate owner type does not change over the study period.;  Ch_bank 
is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a bank acquired a bank that was previously owned by another type of shareholder and zero otherwise; Ch_Family: a family-owned bank is acquired by another type of owner; Ch_Company: 
non-financial company  became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; Ch_State: state  became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; 
Ch_Institut: institutional investor  became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner. 
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Table 9.  The impact of changes of ownership type on risk/performance, Equations (2) and (3) during the global financial crisis period (2007-
2008) 
 
 (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) (2) (3) 
 D_SROA D_SROA D_SROE D_SROE D_ROA D_ROA D_ROE D_ROE D_AJROA D_AJROA D_AJROE D_AJROE 
Change_Year 0.720
**
  0.427
*
  -2.457  0.444  -0.466  -0.140  
 (2.38)  (1.91)  (-1.48)  (0.48)  (-0.88)  (-0.33)  
Ch_Bank  0.270  -0.138  0.510  1.086  -1.595  0.172 
  (0.85)  (-0.49)  (0.56)  (1.34)  (-1.08)  (0.27) 
Ch_Family  -0.187  -0.0635  -1.143  2.273  -0.347  -0.956 
  (-0.61)  (-0.18)  (-0.40)  (1.40)  (-0.54)  (-0.95) 
Ch_Company  0.00210  0.253  -5.681  0.646  0.257  0.218 
  (0.01)  (0.93)  (-1.16)  (0.77)  (0.45)  (0.35) 
Ch_State  1.740
**
  1.407
**
  -2.620
*
  -0.563  -1.004  -0.436 
  (2.46)  (2.04)  (-1.80)  (-0.26)  (-1.31)  (-0.71) 
ch_invest  2.382
***
  1.356
**
  -3.238  -1.695  -0.200  -1.042 
  (3.24)  (2.11)  (-0.92)  (-0.61)  (-0.24)  (-0.96) 
LIQUID -0.00254 -0.00227 0.00130 0.00163 0.00230 -0.00228 0.0132 0.0120 0.00285 0.00368 -0.00123 -0.000655 
 (-0.51) (-0.44) (0.39) (0.48) (0.12) (-0.14) (0.96) (0.90) (0.44) (0.55) (-0.20) (-0.11) 
NNII -0.0214
*
 -0.0232
*
 -0.00954
*
 -0.0107
**
 -0.0253 -0.0225 0.0342 0.0380 0.00235 0.00159 -0.00791 -0.00809 
 (-1.71) (-1.78) (-1.96) (-2.11) (-0.57) (-0.49) (1.35) (1.41) (0.41) (0.27) (-0.52) (-0.50) 
E_TA 0.0303
*
 0.0297
*
 0.00568 0.00498 -0.0489 -0.0461 -0.0740 -0.0728 0.00347 0.00307 0.0167 0.0165 
 (1.83) (1.79) (1.13) (1.00) (-1.09) (-1.04) (-1.28) (-1.26) (0.24) (0.21) (0.68) (0.67) 
LNTA 0.169 0.170 0.0496 0.0498 -0.558 -0.559 -1.099 -1.097 -0.0355 -0.0356 0.0663 0.0625 
 (1.28) (1.27) (1.06) (1.05) (-1.15) (-1.15) (-1.49) (-1.48) (-0.29) (-0.28) (0.23) (0.21) 
CIR -0.0000552 -0.0000285 -0.00162 -0.00161 0.0470 0.0463 -0.00437 -0.00491 0.00836
*
 0.00866
*
 0.00791 0.00825 
 (-0.01) (-0.01) (-0.42) (-0.41) (1.43) (1.38) (-0.43) (-0.47) (1.91) (1.94) (1.12) (1.14) 
SP -0.0177 -0.0109 -0.0575 -0.0571 -0.147 -0.105 1.429 1.435 -0.271 -0.276 -0.576 -0.589
*
 
 (-0.18) (-0.11) (-0.98) (-0.94) (-0.18) (-0.13) (1.30) (1.29) (-1.06) (-1.05) (-1.64) (-1.65) 
REG 0.0252 0.0161 -0.0195 -0.0271 0.0247 0.0381 0.0844 0.0912 -0.102 -0.100 -0.0839 -0.0791 
 (0.66) (0.42) (-0.61) (-0.83) (0.30) (0.46) (0.79) (0.86) (-1.02) (-1.00) (-1.13) (-1.05) 
_cons -0.774 -0.650 0.492 0.609 3.191 2.888 -2.622 -2.834 1.469 1.479 2.975
*
 3.002
*
 
 (-0.99) (-0.83) (0.82) (0.98) (1.00) (0.88) (-0.85) (-0.89) (0.93) (0.93) (1.70) (1.68) 
r2 0.0672 0.0806 0.0350 0.0564 0.0193 0.0230 0.0298 0.0304 0.0167 0.0206 0.0211 0.0221 
N 361 361 353 353 361 361 353 353 355 355 347 347 
Variable definitions : D_SDROA= difference between the  standard deviation of ROA 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change; D_SDROE= = difference between the  standard deviation of ROE 3 years  after the change and 3 years 
before the change ;  D_ROA = difference between the  return on average assets 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change; D_ROEA = difference  between the return on average equity 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the 
change; D_AJROA= difference  between  AJROA 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change ; D_AJROE= difference  between  AJROE 3 years  after the change and 3 years before the change.; Change_Year=  dummy variable that takes 
the value of 1 the year when the change occurs for banks which experience a change and zero for banks whose ultimate owner type does not change over the study period.;  Ch_bank is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a bank acquired a bank 
that was previously owned by another type of shareholder and zero otherwise; Ch_Family: a family-owned bank is acquired by another type of owner; Ch_Company: non-financial company  became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously 
owned by another type of owner; Ch_State: state  became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by another type of owner; Ch_Institut: institutional investor  became the ultimate owner  of  a bank that was previously owned by 
another type of owner. 
